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APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
THEN AND NOW*
Yves-Marie Morissette**

The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.***

I. THE EVOLUTION OF STANDARDS OF REVIEW OVER TIME
A. The Slow Emergence of Appeals at Common Law
For a range of historical reasons,1 it took a long time for
appellate procedures to develop in the common law world—
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in Toronto at an Appellate Courts Seminar organized by the National Judicial Institute
(NJI) of Canada. It is derived in part from the Wainwright Memorial Lecture delivered in
the Faculty of Law of McGill University in October 2012, and which is now published as
Yves-Marie Morissette, Aspects historiques et analytiques de l’appel en matière civile, 59
MCGILL L.J. 481 (2014) [hereinafter Wainwright Lecture]. I thank my law clerk, JeanPhilippe MacKay, for his assistance while the paper for the NJI was in preparation.
**Judge, Court of Appeal of Quebec.
***William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY
923 (Alexander W. Allison et al. eds., rev. ed. 1975).
1. Several factors combined to delay the emergence of a modern appellate process in
the English common law tradition. The most influential of these factors probably were (i)
the prevalence of jury trials at common law (the absence of written reasons hampers
review); (ii) the early appearance of writs issued by the Royal Courts (the writ of attaint,
the writ of error, the writ of false judgment, the writ of certiorari and even the writ of
habeas corpus) which, to a variable extent fulfilled a function analogous to appeals (Why
bother with appeals when we already catch errors with writs?); and (iii) the early but by all
accounts chaotic development of appeals to the Chancellor in Chancery. (On the chaotic
state of Chancery, see 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH ET AL., HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 437–
42 (1956) (addressing this turmoil in sections called “[t]he inadequacy of the judicial staff”
and “[t]he abuses rampant amongst the official staff”). It is entertaining, to say the least.) In
their essay Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory, Professors Dyzenhaus and Taggart
explain why the giving of reasons—without which appeals are difficult—was a very late
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thus, in England, the modern appellate process only dates back
to the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875.2 By contrast, appeals to
intermediate courts already existed in France and in other
continental European countries as early as the thirteenth
century.3
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feature of the common law tradition. David Dyzenhaus & Douglas Taggart, Reasoned
Decisions and Legal Theory, in Douglas E. Edlin, Common Law Theory 134, 143–44
(2007) (“Recall Lord Mansfield’s (in)famous advice to a colonial governor in 1790:
‘Consider what you think justice requires, and decide accordingly. But never give your
reasons; for your judgment will probably be right; but your reasons will certainly be
wrong.’”). The fact that substantive law was essentially judge-made, un-codified (and for a
long time unprinted) must also have exacerbated these factors. See H. PATRICK GLENN,
LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 240–45 (4th ed.
2010).
2. Judicature Act 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77; Judicature Act 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66. I
say the “modern” appellate process because there had existed at various points in the
distant past different mechanisms (often quite convoluted or strange to modern eyes) for
the review or reconsideration of judgments. In his excellent biography of William Murray,
Professor Poser writes that
[t]he three central courts not only tried cases but also heard appeals. This they
did in an interlocking manner. Appeals from King’s Bench went to the
Exchequer Chamber, composed of the judges of Common Pleas and Exchequer,
or directly to the House of Lords; appeals from Common Pleas went to King’s
Bench; and appeals from Exchequer went to Exchequer Chamber, which in such
cases was composed of judges of King’s Bench and Common Pleas.
NORMAN S. POSER, LORD MANSFIELD: JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF REASON 202 (2013). As a
hereditary peer, Lord Mansfield, “sitting as a member of the House of Lords, . . . might
play a role in deciding an appeal of a case on which he had sat as the trial judge,”
something which the Earl of Shelburne thought “most indecent.” Id.
3. There can be no question that the French law of appeals developed quite early, as
[l]es réformes de Saint-Louis—supprimant le duel judiciaire dans le domaine
royal (1254 et 1258)—firent de l’appel l’instrument majeur des progrès de la
justice royale. Le Parlement, progressivement séparé de la personne du roi, reçut
un afflux d’appels des juridictions seigneuriales et des juges royaux comme les
baillis. En empruntant de nombreuses règles au droit romain par l’intermédiaire
des pratiques méridionales, le style du parlement précisa au XIVe s. les
décisions susceptibles d’appel, le délai de dix jours après la sentence, l’amende
de fol appel, ainsi que toutes les formes requises pour « ajourner » les juges
inférieurs et « intimer » l’autre partie.
Louis Halpérin, Recours (Voies de), in DICTIONNAIRE DE LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE
1307 (Denis Alland & Stephane Rials eds., 2003) (indicating that the appeal became an
important instrument of royal justice, that appeals to Parliament came to replace appeals to
the king, and that French law borrowed the notion of appeal and some of its procedures and
structures from Roman law). Elsewhere in continental Europe, the reception of RomanoCanonical law accounts for the early development of appeals, for “[o]ne of the main
features of canon law is the procedure of appeal, i.e., the review of the judgment of a lower
by a higher court, which for reasons of law or of fact, can consider the lower judgment
wrong and replace it by a better one.” R.C. van Caenegem, History of European Civil
Procedure in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 2-18
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What is more interesting, however, is an aspect of the
origin of appeals shared by both the civil law and the common
law traditions: the slow shift from denouncing the person of the
judge to challenging the judge’s error(s). Both traditions also
have another characteristic in common: the notion of reviewable
error changed through the centuries in a manner which reflected
the dominant legal and political ideas of the times. In a sense,
what we have here is a fragment of intellectual history, though
admittedly a modest one.
B. Denouncing the Judge or Challenging the Judge’s Error(s)?
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(Mauro Cappelletti, chief ed. 1987); see also id. at 2-32–2-40 (describing the impact of
Romano-Canonical law in France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany, England (in Chancery
only), the Low Countries, Sweden, Hungary, Poland, Scotland, and Switzerland).
4. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE
TIME OF EDWARD I at 665 (2d ed. 1895).
5. 2 CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, DE L’ESPRIT DES LOIS, bk. 28, ch. 22–33
(Garnier Frères 1961) (1748). The role of juries was, of course, far less important in old
French law than in English law. That probably accounts for the fact that judges, not juries,
were the prime targets of these review processes.
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Commenting on this aspect of legal history, Sir Frederick
Pollock and F.W. Maitland write that “[t]he idea of a complaint
against a judgment which is not an accusation against the judge
is not easily formed.”4 And indeed, for several centuries in
England, whenever a jury of twenty-four members was satisfied
that an earlier jury of twelve members had returned a false
verdict, the members of the first jury faced severe punishment
for the betrayal of their oath of office. The writ of attaint, only
abolished in 1825, made them liable to imprisonment and
confiscation of their chattels.
Similarly, in France, judges who rendered “erroneous”
judgments could be challenged with the procedure of faussement
which was directed against them personally and put them
personally at risk. Montesquieu devotes several interesting pages
to faussement in De l’esprit des lois.5
Perhaps it should come as no surprise that, in an ancient
(archaic?) constitutional environment, based for a long time on
the divine-right theory of kings, errors, fallacies, or other
perceived mistakes by officials or jurymen empowered to render
justice on behalf of the king were seen as perverse, a mixture of
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blasphemy and treachery (a forfaiture in French), and deserving
of serious sanctions.
C. The Mutations and Long Maturation of the Notion of Error

11/15/2017 09:50:50

6. Would dissents have been possible without the Reformation? How can there be
dissents when the search for a Platonic truth is thought to be the sole point of the exercise?
As a general proposition, the common law tends to be Aristotelian, the civil law Platonic.
Quiet, de facto dissents certainly exist in continental European jurisdictions, but they are
never published or brought to light because they are forbidden. In appellate jurisdictions
such as the Conseil d’État in France, insiders (i.e., judges) are of course well aware of
minority views expressed among themselves during deliberations, but these are not shared
with outsiders (i.e., litigants, counsel, and the general public) in the reasons for judgment.
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From a historical perspective, what is especially revealing
is the maturation over time of the very idea of reviewable or
reversible error. Here too, we find many similarities, and some
sharp differences, between the laws of England and those of
continental Europe. But in both traditions, during this protracted
evolution, each distinct period coincided with a different notion
of error. And as each period receded into the past, a shift
occurred in the understanding of what qualify as findings of fact
or of law warranting review.
During the late Middle Ages, an era when the sacred and
the secular were still closely intertwined, the prevailing notions
are often hard to fathom by today’s standard—they bring to
mind theological disputations and controversies. And they
differ, markedly, from the idea of error we see arising with the
Reformation6 or, soon after, with the Enlightenment, but more
about this anon.
The utilitarian notion of error, which really blossomed
during the Industrial Revolution, first appeared at the time of
Bentham and probably peaked at the time of Langdell. We may
call it the positivist or modern idea of error, which still has real
traction today. But, soon enough in the twentieth century, with
Roscoe Pound, Karl Llewellyn and the American legal realists
on one side, and theorists such as Hans Kelsen or H.L.A. Hart
on the other, another concept of error would begin to take shape.
I believe it remains the current (or post-modern, if one wishes to
be slightly controversial) concept. In other words, this is where
we still are now. I shall try to illustrate, briefly, the last stages of
this evolution. But let me begin with an earlier shift.
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D. A Harbinger of the Enlightenment:
Bushell’s Case and Pluralities of Opinions
One elegant and truly striking indication of such a shift is
found in Bushell’s Case, decided in 1670.7 It involved William
Penn, the son of a famous admiral and, at that time, a Quaker of
twenty-six. He would later illustrate himself in America as the
founder of Pennsylvania. Penn and his friend William Mead had
been prosecuted for “unlawful congregating and assemblies.”8
Despite implacable directions by the presiding judge, the jury
acquitted them. As a result, the jurymen were imprisoned, but
one of them, Bushell, sought a writ of habeas corpus in the
Court of Common Pleas. The case came before a bench presided
over by Sir John Vaughan, who delivered the unanimous
judgment in terms which are astonishingly modern,9 and which,
as it happened, caused the writ of attaint to fall into disuse long
before its actual statutory abolition in 1825.
Bushell was decided many years before the appearance of
the Judicature Act 1873, at a time when reviewing courts (other
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7. Bushell’s Case, Vaughan 135, 124 E.R. 1006 (1670).
8. Id. at 135.
9. Upon the return of the writ, Vaughan concluded that there had been “no cause of fine
or imprisonment” against Bushell and his eleven fellow jurymen:
I would know whether any thing be more common, than for two men students,
barristers, or Judges, to deduce contrary and opposite conclusions out of the
same case in law? And is there any difference that the two men should infer
distinct conclusions from the same testimony: Is any thing more known than that
the same author, and place in that author, is forcibly urg’d to maintain contrary
conclusions, and the decision hard, which is in the right? Is any thing more
frequent in the controversies of religion, than to press the same text for opposite
tenents? How then comes it to pass that two persons may not apprehend with
reason and honesty, what a witness, or many, say, to prove in the understanding
of one plainly one thing, but in the apprehension of the other, clearly the
contrary thing: must therefore one of these merit fine and imprisonment, because
he doth that which he cannot otherwise do, preserving his oath and integrity?
And this often is the case of the Judge and jury. . . . And by the way I must here
note, that the verdict of a jury, and the evidence of a witness are very different
things, in the truth and falsehood of them: a witness swears but to what he hath
heard or seen, generally or more largely, to what hath fallen under his senses.
But a jury-man swears to what he can inferr and conclude from the testimony of
such witnesses, by the act and force of his understanding, to be the fact inquired
after, which differs nothing in the reason, though much in the punishment, from
what a Judge, out of various cases consider’d by him, inferrs to be the law in the
question before him.
Id. at 141–42 or 1009.
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than the Chancellor’s Court) operated primarily with prerogative
writs—habeas corpus in this instance. But writ-driven judicial
review obviously prefigured what would eventually become
judicial review and appeals. More to the point, the tone of this
remarkable judgment, rendered at a time when Locke, Newton,
and Spinoza were at work, and when the Enlightenment was
right over the horizon, is a potent harbinger of what was about to
emerge. It is not clear to me that Vaughan’s brand of thinking
would have been possible before the Reformation. It certainly
departed from what could be labelled theological10 thinking
about law and I doubt it would ever have been tolerated under
Canon Law in the Vatican.
The great master of this period, of course, was Lord
Mansfield, who sat as Chief Justice of the Court of King’s
Bench from 1756 to 1788. He was steeped in Roman law, civil
law, and the lex merchant of the time, and his lifespan coincides
almost exactly with what we call the Age of Enlightenment. It is
an era of fierce public debate, marked by major, judge-made
changes in the law, most in the name of Reason. Quite apart
from a number of causes célèbres11 that he heard and decided,
Mansfield today is remembered primarily for his general and
long-lasting influence on the orderly development of the
common law.12

39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 34 Side B
11/15/2017 09:50:50

10. Or, if one prefers, dogmatic.
11. Thus, he held that general warrants were illegal, Money v. Leach, 97 E.R. 1075
(1765), reversed the declaration of outlawry against the seditious libeller John Wilkes, R. v.
Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527 (1770), and by his own estimation, see POSER, supra note 2, at 295,
set some 14,000 to 15,000 slaves free as a result of his celebrated judgment in Somerset v.
Stewart, 98 E.R. 499 (1772).
12. On Mansfield’s legacy, one scholar writes that
[m]ore than two hundred and fifty years after he became a judge, Lord
Mansfield remains a dominant presence, not just to legal scholars but also to
judges and lawyers in Britain, the United States, Canada, and other nations that
follow the Anglo-American legal tradition. Every year, his decisions and
pronouncements are cited as relevant to present-day conditions (or in some cases
explicitly rejected because they are no longer relevant). Courts and governments
around the globe continue to learn from Mansfield’s wisdom.
POSER, supra note 2, at 396. Prefacing a captivating biography of Judge Henry Friendly,
no less a judge than Richard Posner describes Friendly as “the best federal appellate judge
of the past half century.” DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY, GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS
ERA xi (2012). Dorsen considers Friendly’s legacy, noting that
[a]s much as any twentieth-century American jurist, Friendly was in the tradition
of Lord Mansfield, whose innovative thinking moved England’s legal doctrines
closer to the demands of a commercial reformation. Two centuries after
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E. “Error” According to Nineteenth-Century
Rationalists and Positivists
The nineteenth century is the time when the law, looking
back at itself, believes that it is working itself pure. It thinks of
itself as a discipline about to rival the natural sciences in terms
of accuracy and predictability of results. In some measure, this is
a consequence of Jeremy Bentham’s influence: he believed that
laws should always be “rational”13 and that they should all be
codified.14 Characteristically, he is said to have written that “‘I
think therefore I am’ is the argument of Descartes, ‘I am
therefore I do not have to think’ is the argument of the common
law.”15 He was a major philosopher, to be sure, but his
intellectual influence may also at times have been little short of
nefarious.
This is the century of the Industrial Revolution, and of
scientism (a word whose first recorded use, according to the
OED, is in 187016), it is the era of Albert Venn Dicey’s account
of the law of the constitution,17 as well as Halsbury’s Laws of
England and Halsbury’s Statutes,18 the period during which we
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Mansfield, Friendly’s open, analytical, and practical mind led him to create
constructive and even novel solutions to a rapidly growing economy.
Id. at 350 (footnote omitted).
13. There can be no doubt that, as time passed, the pursuit of rationality became easier
because of a host of reasons both endogenous and exogenous to law: the advent and growth
of accurate case reporting, the decline of civil juries coinciding with the rise of judgment
writing by judges in civil cases, the invention and dissemination of printing, the spread of
literacy, and the like.
14. It is he who coined the word “codification” in English. CHARLES WARREN, A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 513 (1911) (describing Bentham as “the inventor of the
words, ‘codify,’ and ‘codification’”).
15. This quotation may be apocryphal (I have never been able to trace it) but I distinctly
remember from my student days in England that a distinguished legal academic used it
verbatim in a lecture. It is, at any rate, quite consistent with Bentham’s distaste for many
common law rules and institutions. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and Right
Answers, 74 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 355, 355 (1999) (quoting an 1811 letter from Bentham to
President James Madison in which he characterizes the common law as a “yoke . . . about
[the] necks” of Madison and his compatriots).
16. See Scientism, OED.COM, http://0-www.oed.com/ (tracing word origin to 1870).
17. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1885).
18. HALSBURY ET AL., THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, BEING A COMPLETE STATEMENT OF
THE WHOLE LAW OF ENGLAND (1907); HALSBURY ET AL., THE COMPLETE STATUTES OF
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see a rise and hardening of stare decisis as a decisionmaking
rule. It is also the golden of age the declaratory theory of the
common law.19 It is an age of exactness and formalism,
characterised by a quest for certainty, an era of picking gnats
with tweezers in the hope, after Darwin, that minutiae will
reveal to us why the law should remain static or how it should
occasionally evolve.
Much later than Bentham, but on a parallel course, the
American Christopher Columbus Langdell invented his own
science of the common law at Harvard Law School. He may not
have been the pathetic dunce that Grant Gilmore depicts in his
entertaining Storrs Lectures, in which he speaks of this period as
the Age of Faith.20 There can be little doubt, however, that had
Langdell been an appellate judge, nothing would have found
favour in his eyes that did not coincide exactly with his own
views on any issue; everything else would have warranted
reversal as clearly wrong.
The culmination of this vision of law is an environment in
which the quest for the one and only right answer provides a
singleness of purpose for all pursuits, intellectual or
professional. In such an environment, virtually any disagreement
with the findings of a lower jurisdiction, whether of law or of
fact, justifies reversal. The costs of appellate litigation and the
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ENGLAND CLASSIFIED AND ANNOTATED IN CONTINUATION OF HALSBURY’S LAWS OF
ENGLAND (1929).
19. The theory goes back to Blackstone’s Commentaries, which first appeared in 1766.
See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND [69] (1852)
(asserting that “the law in [a] case being solemnly declared and determined, what before
was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which is not in the
breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to his private sentiments: he
being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the
known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to
maintain and expound the old one”). Lord Reid called it a “fairy tale.” Reid, The Judge as
Lawmaker, 12 J. SOC’Y OF PUB. TEACHERS OF L. (NEW SERIES) 22, 22 (1972).
20. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW, 38–43 (2d ed. 2014). Gilmore
writes that “Langdell seems to have been an essentially stupid man who, early in his life,
hit on one great idea to which, thereafter, he clung with all the tenacity of a genius.” Id. at
38. In fact, Langdell was an innovator, and modern legal education in universities is much
in his debt. See generally, e.g., BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C.C. LANGDELL 1826–1906 (2009). But he most decidedly
was of the view that, to every legal question, there is one and only one right answer,
discoverable by scientific enquiry, the law library and law reports being the laboratory and
instruments of lawyers.
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complexities of procedure21 are the factors that restrict the scope
of appellate review—in other words, not some self-imposed
concept of deference or self-restraint (or of futility of
reconsideration), but red tape and steep transaction costs in
litigation.
By the mid-twentieth century in the United States, and later
in England but never there as decisively as in the United States,
this Age of Faith would come to something of an end. In
England, strict adherence to precedent remained an article of
faith well into the 1960s. Lord Simonds presided over a period
of “substantive formalism,” as Robert Stevens calls it,22 which
marked the final phase of a conception of law and adjudication
that had appeared well over a century earlier. Thus,
Lord Simonds as senior Law Lord ensured that “justice as
certainty” prevailed in the House of Lords since most of the
Law Lords generally favoured precedent to principle,
refining rather than rationalising the law, and applying the
law as it was, not as they might wish it to be. Law reform
23
was for the legislature.

Substantive formalism constituted the apotheosis of the
declaratory theory.
F. “Error” According to Twentieth Century
Skeptics and Realists

11/15/2017 09:50:50

21. This is not yet the era of access to justice. Dickens’s Bleak House offers an image of
how things worked that is not merely a caricature.
22. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW AND POLITICS: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AS A JUDICIAL
BODY 1800–1976, at 326–35 (1979) (discussing Lord Simonds’s career in the context of a
“politics of substantive formalism”).
23. ALAN PATERSON, FINAL JUDGMENT: THE LAST LAW LORDS AND THE SUPREME
COURT 255 (2013) (footnote omitted).
24. See generally GILMORE, supra note 20, at 61–88.
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Next, the First and the Second World Wars, the Great
Depression, much upheaval, and a range of other societal factors
ushered in what Gilmore calls the Age of Anxiety.24 (The Age of
Scepticism would be as accurate a description, in my view.) The
first clear sign, according to him, was the reaction to the
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publication of Benjamin Cardozo’s Storrs Lectures, delivered at
Yale in 1920.25 Gilmore explains:
Our dawning Age of Anxiety is perfectly symbolized by
the mysterious—the almost mystical—figure of Benjamin
Nathan Cardozo. . . . The thing that is hardest to understand
about The Nature of the Judicial Process is the furor which
its publication caused. Nothing can better illustrate the
extraordinary hold which the Langdellian concept of law
had acquired, not only on the legal but on the popular
26
mind.

11/15/2017 09:50:50

25. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). But, as
Lon Fuller observed, “Cardozo did not follow the example of those who make relativism
itself an absolute.” Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376,
377 (1946).
26. GILMORE, supra note 20, at 67, 69 (footnote omitted).
27. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960);
ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1941). Of the two books,
Llewellyn’s is the more challenging. Pound and Llewellyn held many of the same views,
however. See N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997).
28. Wainwright Lecture, supra note *, at 532–48.
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In less than one generation, the Langdellian model of legal
reasoning would lose much of its appeal, in large measure
because of the emergence of a new and powerful jurisprudential
school, known as American legal realism. Unlike Langdellian
jurisprudence, it is not at all monolithic, and indeed to call it a
school may be a bit of a misnomer. Two of its most influential
members, Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn, took a special
interest in appellate processes and caselaw. Each wrote an
impressive monograph on the subject27 in which he gives an
account of judicial decisionmaking which marks a clear
departure from Langdellian views about precedents and “right
answers.” I have elsewhere devoted some sixteen pages to a
detailed discussion of Llewellyn’s thesis, under the title
L’élaboration et l’ordonnancement du droit par l’appel.28 I will
therefore not delve into the question here. Suffice it to say that
Llewellyn’s concept of judicial decisionmaking presents the role
of appellate courts as one of preserving the systemic coherence
of the law, and especially judge-made law, rather than one of
reviewing for error all lower-court judgments which could be
considered defective in a Langdellian sense. The essay includes
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29. [1966] 3 All E.R. 77 (characterizing precedent as “an indispensable foundation
upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases,” but also
recognizing that “too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case
and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law”).
30. ALAN PATTERSON, LAW LORDS: HOW BRITAIN’S TOP JUDGES SEE THEIR ROLE
149–51 (1982).
31. More on this later. See infra note 45.
32. [1999] 2 A.C. 349 (acknowledging that “[t]he whole of the common law is judgemade and only by judicial change in the law is the common law kept relevant in a changing
world,” and that “a judgment overruling an earlier decision is bound to operate to some
extent retrospectively” because it will apply “to all cases subsequently coming before the
courts,” even those in which the relevant actions took place before the change in the law).
33. RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY
(2016).
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what can be described, I think without exaggeration, as an
onslaught on the one-single-answer doctrine dear to Langdell.
And implicit in this view, or perhaps even explicit at times, is a
concept of interpretive pluralism which we have seen at work in
Canadian administrative law for over thirty-five years.
Change in English law came later, was more laborious and
apparently not as pronounced. In 1962, Viscount (formerly
Lord) Simonds retired from the House of Lords, where he had
been first appointed in 1944 and had served as Lord Chancellor
between 1951 and 1954. Two years later, under a Labour
government, Lord Gardiner became Lord Chancellor. His role in
the adoption of the (rather extraordinary) 1966 Practice
Statement29 on precedent in the House of Lords is fully
documented in a Paterson monograph30 and it makes for
fascinating reading. Quite clearly, a new concept of precedent
and of stare decisis was taking shape. English law was never as
permeable to the ideas of American legal realism as was
Canadian law and this is well apparent in administrative law.31
There are signs of change, however, and of a partial
incorporation of realist ideas. Thus, I would argue that what the
House of Lords did, heroically, some sixteen years ago in
Kleinwort Benson v. Lincoln City Council32 is such a sign, and a
strong one too, of a shift in paradigm: the House practically
abandoned the declaratory theory of the common law, whose
apotheosis, as we saw, was substantive formalism.
A recent monograph33 by Judge Posner (his sixty-fourth
title, according to a review in the Harvard Magazine34) is
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certainly the most current, and possibly the most eloquent,
account of what legal realism may mean today in appellate
judging. It is true that Judge Posner carefully eschews the label
legal realist for himself. As he points out, the use of this
expression in academic circles still occasionally conveys a
disagreeable nuance of cynicism towards legal reasoning. (I
would have said that the realists were uncomfortably lucid rather
than cynical but Judge Posner does make a plausible point here.)
He quickly adds, however, that “[r]ealism is equivalent to
pragmatism in the lay, not philosophical, sense of the word” and
he describes himself as a pragmatist.35 His critique (at times
hilarious, and no doubt deliberately so) of originalism as an
avatar of formalism, of conventional canons of statutory
interpretation that yield no clear answer, of convoluted legal
reasoning dressed up as logico-deductive analysis, of unweighted multifactor tests that confuse rather than clarify
judicial decisionmaking, of blinkered and ill-informed legal
arguments that miss the essential (often economic) realities of
particular disputes, and indeed his very critique of standards of
review on appeal, all ring refreshingly candid and true.36
The distinctions or clarifications a Canadian judge might
wish to add are of no real account here. Judge Posner could be
critical of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., but he never concealed
his admiration for Holmes the judge and Holmes the realist.37
More than once, his latest book brings to mind the lucid and
lapidary style of Justice Holmes, as when Judge Posner writes:
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 37 Side B
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34. Lincoln Caplan, Rhetoric and Law: The Double Life of Richard Posner, America’s
Most Contentious Legal Reformer, HARV. MAGAZINE, Jan.–Feb. 2016, at 49, available at
http://harvardmagazine.com/2015/12/rhetoric-and-law.
35. POSNER, supra note 33, at 79.
36. Id. at 83–88, 101–07, 117–20, 126–32.
37. It is Justice Holmes, after all, who wrote, “We must think things not words, or at
least we must constantly translate our words into the facts for which they stand, if we are to
keep to the real and the true.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in
Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899). Judge Posner reproduced this entire article in
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS,
SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.
(1997). Holmes shared the view expressed in it with his colleague Justice Brandeis, who,
dissenting with Justice Holmes in DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927), which was
overruled in part on other grounds by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941),
observed that “in the case at bar, also, the logic of words should yield to the logic of
realities.” Id. at 43 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
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“All this is implicit in the emphasis I have placed on the
indeterminacy of law, the fact that it is not a science or even a
social science, that it is a kind of groping.”38 Indeed, let us grope
along, in as well-informed a way as we can manage under the
circumstances, but let us not delude ourselves about what we are
doing.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW HERE AND NOW
A. The Fundamental Distinction Between Judicial Review
and Appeals

11/15/2017 09:50:50

38. POSNER, supra note 33, at 227.
39. [1979] 2 S.C.R 227 (C.U.P.E.).
40. See in particular, in the aftermath of Dunsmuir, Yves-Marie Morissette,
Rétrospective et prospective sur le contentieux administratif, 39 R.D.U.S. 1 (2008–2009).
41. See, e.g., Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail c. Société Terminaux
Montréal Gateway, 2015 QCCA 542 (Que. Ct. App.); Comité exécutif de l’Ordre des
ingénieurs du Québec c. Roy, [2011] R.J.Q. 1700, 2011 QCCA 1707 (Que. Ct. App.); RCI
Environnement inc. c. Commission des transports du Québec, [2007] R.J.Q. 1152, 2007
QCCA 666 (Que. Ct. App.); Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail c. Fontaine,
[2005] R.J.Q. 2203, 2005 QCCA 775 (Que. Ct. App.).
42. [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9.
43. See, e.g., Canadian Broad. Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc., [2015] 3 S.C.R. 615, 2015
SCC 57; Sask. (Human Rights Comm’n) v. Whatcott, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, 2013 SCC 11;
Alta. (Information and Privacy Comm’r) v. Alta. Teachers’ Ass’n, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654,
2011 SCC 61; Can. (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2009
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Standards of review in administrative law (or what we
commonly call “judicial review” in the narrow sense) were once
a hotly debated issue. Subject to a few qualifications I mention
below, they are much less controversial today. The starting point
of modern public law in this country is the foundational
precedent of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Union
of Public Employees v. New Brunswick Liquor Corporation,39 a
case whose immense significance I frequently underscored in
law review articles40 as well as in judgments.41 The pivotal
importance of this case was reaffirmed in Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick,42 the other landmark decision in the field. Between
those two cases, and after Dunsmuir, there were dozens of other
judgments in the Supreme Court of Canada which enriched our
understanding of judicial review43 and there were also, of
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course, a few instances in which the Court misfired, sometimes
badly so.44 Out of this corpus grew a doctrine of deference
towards tribunals and other administrative decisionmakers
which inspired a great deal of academic commentary.45
This theory or doctrine of deference, also sometimes
referred to as interpretive pluralism, is a home-grown
development: when C.U.P.E. was decided, in 1979, Canadian
administrative law began to part ways with English
administrative law.46 In my view, the doctrine came into
existence in North America because of the impact of American
legal realism on legal scholarship, legal thinking, and, in
particular, judicial thinking.47 It remains currently the prevailing
approach to judicial review, even though there are occasional
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SCC 12; B.C. Tel. Co. v. Shaw Cable Sys. (BC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 739; Domtar v. Que.
(Commission d’appel en matière de lésions professionnelles), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 756.
44. One disastrous example, in my humble opinion, is the judgment in Union des
employés de services, local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, decided unanimously
after twenty-six months of deliberations, by a panel of four judges (three of the original
seven, Judges Estey, Chouinard, and LeDain, having respectively retired, died, and become
incapacitated during the process). It is now mercifully defunct as a result of Dunsmuir.
45. See, e.g., PAUL DALY, A THEORY OF DEFERENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: BASIS,
APPLICATION AND SCOPE (2012).
46. As a result of Lord Diplock’s judgment in O’Reilly v. Mackman, [1983] 2 A.C. 237,
English judges generally show no deference to administrative decisionmakers on questions
of law; there is a presumption that the law is for the judge. Anisminic v. Foreign Comp.
Comm’n, [1969] 2 A.C. 147, 167 sowed the seed, noting that “it is for the courts to
interpret the statute, by which an inferior tribunal is given jurisdiction, to see whether it
acted within it.” See also R. v. Hull University Visitor, ex parte Page, [1993] A.C. 682, 692
(explaining that “bodies other than courts, in so far as they are required to apply the law . . .
are required to apply the law correctly,” and that “[i]f they apply the law incorrectly they
have not performed their duty correctly and judicial review is available to correct their
error of law so that they may make their decision upon a proper understanding of the law”);
Boddington v. British Transp. Police, [1999] 2 A.C. 143.
According to Professor Endicott, this is the result of a distortion of what the House
of Lords in Anisminic actually meant. It ruled that an error of law that leads the public
authority to step outside its jurisdiction results in a nullity that is fully reviewable.
TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 303 (2009). “Yet the Law Lords went
on in later cases to invent a rule that it is unlawful for a public authority to make a decision
based on any error of law. One remarkable feature of the novel doctrine is the way in
which it arose from a myth about Anisminic.” Id.
47. The doctrine does have obvious affinities, however, with a parallel doctrine in the
United States. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (2017); Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 511 DUKE L.J. 511
(1989).
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signs of departure from this received doctrine. The most
troubling one in recent times is an emerging tendency to favour
a segmentation of tribunals’ decisions, which has the potential of
dragging us down a slippery slope towards the review for
correctness of all questions of law.48 The received doctrine may
yet undergo significant metamorphoses, as might happen as a
result of a case recently heard in the Supreme Court of Canada;
the case reignited an old controversy about the review of
persistently contradictory decisions by tribunals acting within
their jurisdiction.49 This said, the doctrine of deference is not the
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48. Dissenting in Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3,
2015 SCC 16, Justice Abella wrote:
My final concern is a practical one. What do we tell reviewing courts to do when
they segment a tribunal decision and subject each segment to different standards
of review only to find that those reviews yield incompatible conclusions? How
many components found to be reasonable or correct will it take to trump those
found to be unreasonable or incorrect? Can an overall finding of reasonableness
or correctness ever be justified if one of the components has been found to be
unreasonable or incorrect? If we keep pulling on the various strands, we may
eventually find that a principled and sustainable foundation for reviewing
tribunal decisions has disappeared. And then we will have thrown
out Dunsmuir’s baby with the bathwater.
Id. at ¶ 173.
Earlier that year, in Tervita Corporation v. Canada (Commissioner of Competition),
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 161, 2015 SCC 3, Justice Abella had concurred in the result but had
rejected the standard of correctness as inapplicable and opted instead for a reasonableness
standard. Id. at ¶ 171. In SODRAC, also decided in 2015, she dissented for the same reason.
Justice Rothstein, writing for the majority in that case, offered the following rejoinder,
Justice Abella objects to the segmentation of issues for the purpose of standard
of review analysis and to the confusion she says this causes. This is the same
objection she raised in Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), [2015] 2
S.C.R. 3, 2015 SCC 16, a decision issued by this Court in April 2015. Saguenay
is the controlling authority and, on the issue of standard of review, these reasons
apply Saguenay.
Id. at ¶ 41. If Saguenay does carry this kind of weight, it will be difficult not to fall back
into the logic of cases such as Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. International
Union of Operating Engineers Local 796, [1970] S.C.R. 425, itself based on Anisminic, but
that is precisely what C.U.P.E. was meant to correct. One court of appeal appears to share
this view of Saguenay. See Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp., 2015 ABCA 225 (Alta. Ct.
App.) Two of my colleagues and I took a different view in Commission des droits de la
personne et de la jeunesse c. Côté, 2015 QCCA 1544 (Que. Ct. App.).
49. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Can. Ltd., 2016 SCC 29, 2016 CSC 29; see also
Atomic Energy of Can. Ltd. v. Wilson, [2015] 4 F.C.R. 467, 2015 FCA 17 (Stratas, J.A.,
for the Court), rev’d, 2016 SCC 29, 2016 CSC 29. Justice Stratas’s reasons are of particular
interest here. See id. at ¶¶ 52–56 (describing “persistent discord” among specialized
tribunals, expressing concern that decisions have “depended on the identity of the
adjudicator” and opining that Dunsmuir indicates that rule-of-law considerations require
court to intervene “by giving its view of the correct answer”). Many years ago, I argued
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dominant paradigm in areas other than administrative law.50 In
that sense, appeals still differ from judicial review, unless of
course the object of the appeal is a judgment in judicial review.
Outside the confines of administrative law, other appellate
standards of review apply. These are not entirely dissimilar from
those applicable to judicial review, for a common notion of
reasonableness or, more accurately, unreasonableness, pervades
both judicial review and appeals. An excellent monograph on
the topic, now in its second edition,51 does not take into account
Dunsmuir and ulterior developments, but it remains perhaps the
most thorough study of the subject and a safe guide on appellate
standards.52
For my present purposes, I will offer a simpler account of
standards and focus on what is to me the most crucial distinction
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that, according to one concept of the rule of law, review was warranted in cases of
persistent inconsistencies. Yves-Marie Morissette, Le contrôle de la compétence
d’attribution: thèse, antithèse et synthèse, 16 R.D.U.S. 591, 632–33, 642–43 (1986). Mr.
Justice LeBel, then a member of the Court of Appeal of Quebec, agreed in Produits PétroCanada Inc. v. Moalli, [1987] R.J.Q. 261 at ¶ 25 (Que. Ct. App.) (quoting Morissette,
supra this note). Domtar and B.C. Telephone first discarded and then rehabilitated to a
limited extent the view in question. In his reasons in Wilson, Justice Stratas does not
mention Domtar, but it seems to me that, quite apart from the issue of “unjust” dismissal
raised by the case, a prior and a significant issue, pertaining specifically to the scope of
judicial review, must be addressed first in disposing of that appeal. And the question is not
who has the last say on the meaning of “unjust,” but, rather, under what precise
circumstances courts are entitled to have the last say in the judicial review of a tribunal’s
decision. That is the interesting and difficult question, forever reargued in such cases. In
my view, not all divergences of opinion qualify as inconsistencies. See Société Terminaux
Montréal Gateway, 2015 QCCA 542 (discussing meanings ascribed to term “essential fact”
by various decisionmakers). To hold that they do amounts to substituting appeals to
judicial review.
50. There are obvious historical, institutional, and even policy reasons why deference
towards reasonable legal interpretations (or decisions) is not a doctrine which should easily
extend to areas of law unrelated to judicial review and administrative law. In my view,
however, there are no analytical reasons why this should be so.
51. ROGER P. KERANS & KIM M. WILLEY, STANDARDS OF REVIEW EMPLOYED BY
APPELLATE COURTS (2d ed. 2006). Judge Kerans was a member of the Court of Appeal of
Alberta from 1980 to 1997, and Ms. Willey, a lawyer educated in Canada, is at present
pursuing the Ph.D. in law at Cambridge.
52. Kerans and Willey identify five “traditional” standards: (i) absolute deference,
(ii) unreasonableness, (ii) patent unreasonableness, (iv) correctness (or concurrence), and
(v) fresh assessment (or trial de novo on the record). Id. at 38–39 (footnote omitted). These
categories remain useful despite the fact that Dunsmuir, of course, collapsed (ii) and (iii) in
judicial review. Rather than a standard of review, absolute deference is a complete bar to
review; the inability of the Crown to appeal fact-based acquittals is perhaps the only
significant example of this sort of legal restriction on appellate review.
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at work here, namely the distinction between law and fact.
Before I do so, however, it is worth mentioning that, on appeal,
there are certain types of first-instance decisions (often
described as “discretionary”) which attract a perceptible degree
of deference from appellate courts. The leading commentators
call this category “guidelines cases”53 and offer as illustrations,
inter alia,
i.

quantum of damages for non-pecuniary loss,

ii.

the custody of children,

iii.

family support,

iv.

interlocutory orders and case-management matters,
and

v.

sentencing.54

11/15/2017 09:50:50

53. KERANS & WILLEY, supra note 51, at 207–47. The category of guideline cases
divides roughly into two sub-groups: “the first are those cases involving the management
of the trial and some aspects of the pre-trial process; the second are those where the rule of
law governing the case makes many factors relevant, and requires the decision-maker to
weigh and balance them.” Id. at 208.
54. Id. at 229–49.
55. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27.
56. Id. at ¶ 49.
57. R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-44 § 241(3) (May 2017) (indicating that court “may make any
final or interim order that it thinks fit” and referring to more than ten possible orders).
58. R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-36 § 49(1) (May 2017) (indicating that the court may, if
“satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of the debtor company’s property or the
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This is really an open-ended category and not an outlier
category. One should not underestimate its scope, for the issue
may arise whenever the application of a rule actually requires
the weighing of a range of factors, something which is not
infrequent. A typical example would be a variation of a custody
order in a judgment which applies (or more accurately, follows)
Gordon v. Goetz55 and weighs the seven separate factors listed
by then-Justice McLachlin in her reasons.56 But the same could
be said of many other judgments: for example, rulings on
oppression remedies under section 241 of the Canada Business
Corporations Act57 or rulings on a debtor-protection order under
the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act.58 The rationale for
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deference here is based, at least in part but sensibly enough, on
the coexistence of several possible, equally valid, and perhaps
even contradictory outcomes to the decisionmaking process.59
B. The Fundamental Distinctions Between Fact and Law
Over the last decade or so, the Supreme Court of Canada
rendered a series of judgments which hinge on this distinction. It
is easy to set out in general terms what they stand for. They
repeatedly underscored the nature of the standard of review on
questions of fact. As a result of Housen v. Nicholaisen60 and
H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General),61 but pursuant also to a
judge-made rule that came into existence much earlier,62 it is
now indisputable in Canadian positive law that, on question of
fact, or on mixed questions of fact and law, the standard of
review on appeal will justify a reversal only in the presence of a
“palpable and overriding error.” Naturally, there is room for
discussion on what amounts to a palpable and overriding error,
and there can be vigorous debates on what is, and what is not, a
question of law, or a question of fact, or a mixed question of law
and fact, and so on. Before I consider these complications, I will
say a few words on what appears to be at this time the lay of the
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interests of a creditor or creditors, make any order that it considers appropriate” and
referring to more than ten possible orders).
59. On this aspect, see Béton Brunet c. Syndicat canadien des communications, de
l’énergie et du papier, section locale 700 (SCEP), 2015 QCCA 188 (Que. Ct. App.), at
¶¶ 40–42, where I stressed that very point.
60. [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, 2002 SCC 33 at ¶ 1, 3–6 (opining that it should be
“unnecessary” to state the rule that “a court of appeal should not interfere with a trial
judge’s reasons unless there is a palpable and overriding error,” and discussing meaning
and application of standard expressed in that phrase).
61. [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, 2005 SCC 25 at ¶ 9 (recognizing Housen rule that “findings of
fact by the trial judge will be disturbed on appeal only for errors that can properly be
characterized as palpable and overriding”).
62. It appears that we owe the precise formulation (“palpable and overriding error”) to
Justice Ritchie in Stein v. The Ship “Kathy K,” [1976] 2 S.C.R. 802. These same words are
nowhere to be found in the Supreme Court of Canada databases prior to 1976. But, citing
decisions that went as far back as 1880, Justice Ritchie wrote in Stein that “[t]hese
authorities are not to be taken as meaning that the findings of fact made at trial are
immutable, but rather that they are not to be reversed unless it can be established that the
learned trial judge made some palpable and overriding error which affected his assessment
of the facts.” Id. at ¶ 7. He may have had a sharp pen but the idea was not new.
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land with respect to these different standards of review. This is
not complicated.63
On appeal, the standard of review for questions of fact and
mixed questions of fact and law is palpable and overriding error.
That is true of all questions of fact, not only in civil but also
(and surprisingly64) in criminal proceedings. So, in essence, and
subject to the often unpredictable exception of the guidelines
cases mentioned above, there are two standards of review on
appeal: palpable and overriding error and mere error. The former
applies to anything other than a question of law, and the latter to
any question of law. I will return below to palpable and
overriding errors but first I will add a few words of clarification
about the standard of mere error. That standard and the standard
of correctness are the same. What they mean for a judge
exercising appellate review is crystal clear: they mean “I get to
decide, period.” The standard of correctness (or error) has been
described as a “concurrence” standard, which is both true and
commendably tactful.65 I use a blunter formulation because I
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63. Judge Posner has noted that “review of purely legal findings is plenary, and of
factual findings (and application of law to fact) deferential in the sense of giving respectful
consideration to the determination by the lower court,” and that “[t]here is a little more to
standards of review, but not much.” POSNER, supra note 33, at 84. These words could
apply here.
64. See R v. Regan, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, 2002 SCC 12, ¶ 117, 118; R v. Oickle, [2000]
2 S.C.R. 3, 2000 SCC 38, ¶ 71; see generally R v. Babos, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309, 2014 SCC
16; R v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, 2007 SCC 26; R v. Clark, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 6, 2005
SCC 2. I say “surprisingly” for epistemic reasons: The presumption of innocence and the
burden of proof in criminal trials are tied to a reasonable doubt, and palpable and
overriding error on appeal raising questions of fact seems a detrimental alteration of what
an accused person is entitled to expect from the judicial system. On the other hand, once it
is conceded that, for a host of institutional reasons, the trier of fact is not to be reversed in
the absence of an obvious mistake, the extension of the standard to criminal cases appears
defensible. Otherwise, perpetual retrials on appeal would become the norm, if only for
appellants who can afford the process, which is not a better form of criminal justice.
65. KERANS & WILLEY, supra note 51, at 39. The authors explain that
[t]he First Edition of this work argued for the preference of the term
“concurrence” in reflection of the fact that it is arrogant for a higher court to
presume that its interpretation is necessarily correct. Canadian appellate courts
have ignored this advice. However, for the purposes of consistency with the
terminology of the Supreme Court of Canada, we will reluctantly use the term
“correctness” to refer to this least deferential standard of review, but only in
association with the preferred expression “concurrence.”
Id. at n.7. I entirely agree with them.
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C. Identifying Questions of Law
The distinction between questions of fact and questions of
law is of considerable importance on appeal. In many cases
heard in the court where I serve, counsel will pay surprisingly
little attention to it. All too often, the distinction is overlooked,
instrumentalised, or greatly distorted. When it is not overlooked,
it frequently becomes itself a matter of debate, which most of
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believe that, regardless of the level at which review occurs, there
is a virtue in exposing appellate arrogance for what it is.
I am not suggesting here that “I get to decide, period” is a
synonym for “I get my way, no matter what.” Of course not:
judges are constrained by the law, but they are constrained by
the law as they honestly understand it to be. There is a subject/
object difficulty at work here. One would have to be naïve
indeed to think that the law’s meaning, especially in the litigious
surroundings where judges live and work, is always as perfectly
plain, and as certain in outcome, as is the formal (but
deceptively certain) formula 2 + 2 = 4. (Indeed, but what 2s?
What is behind the formal symbol?) So “I get to decide, period”
is not a complete license to do as one pleases. It is only the
freedom to let one’s interpretive preference prevail, and only for
the time being. This, in the last analysis, and for most of us
judges, means subject to the interpretive preferences of five of
the nine highest judicial decisionmakers in the land. Unless, of
course, no matter of national importance is at stake, there is no
constitutional issue involved, and Parliament or the relevant
legislature chooses not to get in the way, and so on. Such are the
thoughts that legal realism inspires. Plato would likely be
underwhelmed by all this prattle.
Turning now to the standard of review for questions of fact,
or mixed questions of fact and law, we know from the caselaw
that it is “palpable and overriding error.” As I suggested earlier,
there are two difficulties here: (i) what qualifies as a question of
law, and (ii) what qualifies as a “palpable and overriding” error.
I will now examine these two questions in turn.

11/15/2017 09:50:50
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the time amounts to a dialogue of the deaf.66 Yet there is no
shortage of good scholarship on the topic.67 For my part, the two
most enlightening law review articles I have found are by
Professors Allen and Pardo68 and by Professor Endicott.69 The
views I express here closely follow, I believe, the argument
developed by Professor Endicott, whose opinion I share.70
I begin by saying that some questions, of course, are
undoubtedly questions of law (for example, does a recent
amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure apply retroactively?)
and that some questions are just as assuredly questions of fact
(for example, was John Smith in Ottawa on June 6, 2014?). That
is not where the problem lies. The problem arises where we are
confronted with what is usually called a “mixed question of law
and fact,” a notion I find inherently misleading. When the
analysis is carried through as it should be, we almost always end
up with questions of law or questions of fact.
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66. Many lawyers, of course, can distinguish, in an intuitive way, questions of law from
questions of fact. Regrettably, however, many also cannot, or simply will not if it may
operate detrimentally to their client’s interest. Thus, in Canada (Director of Investigation
& Research, Competition Act) v. Southam, Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, Justice Iacobucci
noted that “[t]he parties vigorously dispute the nature of the problem before the Tribunal.
The appellants say that the problem is one of fact. The respondent insists that the problem
is one of law. In my view, the problem is one of mixed law and fact.” Id. at ¶ 34. It seems
rather strange that such a debate was still ongoing at that level of court. With such
inclinations to argue come what may, how could these counsel be sure that they had
graduated from a law school, as opposed to a “fact school”? In that sense, what the
Supreme Court of Canada explains, painstakingly, in cases such as Housen, 2002 SCC 33,
at ¶¶ 27–36, about the extricable nature of questions of law, is fundamental to
understanding what appeals are for.
67. See generally, e.g., Daniel Jutras, The Narrowing Scope of Appellate Review: Has
the Pendulum Swung Too Far? 32 MAN. L.J. 61 (2016); Frédéric Bachand, Le traitement
en appel des questions de fait, questions de droit et questions mixtes, 86 CAN. BAR REV. 97
(2007); A.L. Goodhart, Appeals on Questions of Fact, 71 L.Q. REV. 402 (1955); Walter
Wheeler Cook, ‘Facts’ and ‘Statements of Fact’, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233 (1937); Jabez Fox,
Law and Fact, 12 HARV. L. REV. 545 (1899).
68. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 1769 (2003). Professor Allen is one of the editors of Wigmore’s treatise and an
evidence scholar. Professor Pardo of the University of Alabama, also an evidence scholar,
is among Professor Allen’s frequent co-authors. The view expressed in this stimulating
article is very much a contrarian one.
69. Timothy A.O. Endicott, Questions of Law, 114 L.Q. REV. 292 (1998). Professor
Endicott, who is Canadian, is a former Dean of Law at the University of Oxford.
70. For a full discussion of the two conflicting theses of these three authors and a more
detailed analysis of the problem, see the Wainwright Lecture, supra note *, at 520–30.
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My own view of the matter is simple. I believe, first, that in
any dispute between A and B, one has to distinguish between the
question presented for decision on its merit, let us call it Y, and
a prior question of characterisation as to whether Y is a question
of law or a question of fact, let us call that prior question X. The
answer to question X (Is Y a question of law or of fact?)
depends on Y’s potential to attract an answer that has a
normative reach beyond the dispute between A and B. In other
words, and to put it plainly, if, because of the reasons you offer
in support of your ruling, you rule not just on the dispute
between A and B, but also on other disputes, whether actual or
potential, the normative reach of the answer you are giving to
question Y entails that you are deciding a question of law.
Indeed, you may stand up and salute: you are making law,
though only interstitially.71 It is trite to say that juries never
decide questions of law. In point of fact, where jury nullification
is tolerated, juries decide questions of law, even though they do
so simply by ignoring a law they find objectionable. Where,
however, jury nullification is not tolerated, as in Canada, the
reason juries never decide questions of law is that they only
render verdicts and they never give reasons.72 I have offered as a
practical illustration of this line of reasoning73 a rather
entertaining little case74 which three of my colleagues decided
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71. Here comes Holmes again. As is I think very well known, Justice Holmes wrote that
he “recognize[d] without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so
only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A common law
judge could not say ‘I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense and
shall not enforce it in my court.’” S. Pac. Co v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes,
J., dissenting). In so doing, “he of course rejected the classical or purely declaratory theory
of the judicial function.” Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The Holmesian Judge in
Theory and Practice, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 19, 33 (1955).
72. A rather vivid illustration of the problem can be found, albeit only indirectly, in R v.
Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, ¶¶ 65–68. The scorching comments aimed at counsel by
Chief Justice Dickson in that opinion were also a denunciation of a forensic tactic which
amounted to an incitement to jury nullification. The acquittals in that memorable case were
restored by the Supreme Court of Canada on constitutional grounds. The jury, which had
returned verdicts of not guilty in the first place, had done so, of course, without reasons.
Had it been required to give reasons, it is at least plausible, given the tenor of counsel for
the defence’s closing speech that the jury would have deliberately derogated from the law
then thought to be in force.
73. Wainwright Lecture, supra note *, at 528–30.
74. Paradis v. R, 2007 QCCA 281 (Que. Ct. App.); Paradis v. R, No. 450-36-000515040, 2004 CanLII 49126 (Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2004); R. v. Paradis, No. 450-01-031282036, 2004 CanLII 3327 (Ct. Que. July 7, 2004). Until the case reached the Court of Appeal,
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after I had granted leave to appeal, on “a question of law alone,”
as required by the Criminal Code.
When seen in this light, the problem of characterization
(i.e. question X, above) is much less troubling than it is
customarily thought to be. There are sound reasons of legal
policy for approaching the problem in this manner, reasons
which Justice Rothstein sets out in the recent Supreme Court
judgment in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp.75 By
itself, the interpretation of a contract is a question of fact,
something which is well accepted in civil law countries and
which is the only sensible answer to the question of
characterization. It seemed self-evident to the leading
commentators76 and I entirely agree with them.
What Sattva decided has long been the law in France,
where the supreme judicial court, the Cour de cassation, does
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no one, including judges and counsel, had noticed a salient fact: the admittedly intoxicated
driver who had just gotten into the car was sitting by mistake in a vehicle identical to his
own but belonging to another person. Paradis, 2007 QCCA at ¶ 6 (holding that the failure
of the judge below to consider evidence indicating that the driver’s own keys would not
have started the stranger’s car was an error of law that determined the outcome of the case,
and entering an acquittal).
75. [2014] 2 R.C.S. 633, 2014 SCC 53. Justice Rothstein points out in Sattva that
[t]he purpose of the distinction between questions of law and those of mixed fact
and law further supports this conclusion. One central purpose of drawing a
distinction between questions of law and those of mixed fact and law is to limit
the intervention of appellate courts to cases where the results can be expected to
have an impact beyond the parties to the particular dispute. It reflects the role of
courts of appeal in ensuring the consistency of the law, rather than in providing a
new forum for parties to continue their private litigation. For this reason,
Southam . . . identified the degree of generality (or “precedential value”) as the
key difference between a question of law and a question of mixed fact and law.
The more narrow the rule, the less useful will be the intervention of the court of
appeal.
Id. at ¶ 51.
76. KERANS & WILLEY, supra note 51. They write that
[a] curious situation arises about the interpretation of documentary evidence,
including contracts. Misdirection about the rules of interpretation is of course a
reviewable legal error. But, the meaning of a document is a matter of fact; the
first judge seeks to find the true intention of the author or authors. This is often a
matter of inference from the actual words used. Yet the appellate courts
regularly substitute their view for that of the trial court. Why should documents
get this special treatment? The interpretation of documents is, then, an area
where Canadian reviewing courts, unlike some U.S. courts, have not yet faced
the logic implicit in their approach to other factual questions. One reviewing
court, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, has refused to re-try the interpretation
of documents.
Id. at 142 (footnotes omitted).
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not entertain pourvois en cassation concerning the interpretation
of contracts because, as a rule, the Cour de cassation deals only
with questions of law.77 Interestingly enough, three exceptions
to this rather strict definition of jurisdiction developed over
time: they concern “les contrats d’application étendue ou
répétée,” “les contrats homologués par les pouvoirs publics,”
and “les conventions collectives.”78 The second and third
exceptions are of limited relevance here because they pertain to
legal devices that have no clear equivalent in our law (i.e.
French collective agreements are very different from ours). But
the first category, which is far from negligible, applies,
typically, to standard-form contracts and, especially, insurance
policies. It is therefore unsurprising that the first cases after
Sattva which softened the impact of this important precedent,
Ledcor Construction Ltd. v. Northbridge Indemnity Insurance
Company79 and MacDonald v. Chicago Title Insurance
Company of Canada,80 both involved standard-form insurance
policies.
D. Finding “Palpable and Overriding” Errors

11/15/2017 09:50:50

77. The matter is elegantly explained in a standard treatise on cassation. See JACQUES
BORÉ & LOUIS BORÉ, LA CASSATION EN MATIÈRE CIVILE, 275–80 (4th ed. 2008).
Evidently, the characterization of a contract—as one of employment or one of agency—
often will qualify as a question of law.
78. Id. at 280–84.
79. 2015 ABCA 121 (Alta. Ct. App.), at ¶¶ 15–18, (holding that the interpretation of a
standard-form insurance contract is reviewable on a standard of correctness), rev’d 2016
SCC 27 (holding that the interpretation of a standard-form insurance contract is an
exception to the Sattva rule, that the appropriate standard of review in this case was
correctness, but that the Court of Appeal’s interpretation was incorrect).
80. 2015 ONCA 842 (Ont. Ct. App.), at ¶¶ 35, 37, 41 (holding that the interpretation of
a standard-form insurance contract is reviewable on a standard of correctness), motion for
leave to appeal to S. Ct. of Can. dismissed (No. 36830, Oct. 20, 2016).
81. See, e.g., P.L. c. Benchetrit, [2010] R.J.Q. 1853, 2010 QCCA 1505 (Que. Ct. App.);
Regroupement des CHSLD Christ-Roi (Centre hospitalier, soins de longue durée) c.
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The words palpable and overriding (manifeste et dominante
or manifeste et déterminante in French) convey a nuance of
intensity; they speak of the degree of obviousness that the error
must evince in order to warrant review. The court on which I
serve offered various clarifications of this notion on several
occasions.81 In the recent Vidéotron, s.e.n.c. c. Bell ExpressVu,
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l.p.,82 we were faced with a judgment in which an experienced
and respected trial judge, after a trial of fifty-seven days raising
issues of considerable technical complexity, had disregarded as
not in evidence 37,675 pages of financial data and statistics used
by the plaintiff’s experts and admitted by the defendants. As a
result, we awarded some $83,000,000 of damages (amounting,
apparently, to over $140,000,000 with interest and costs) to the
plaintiff, where the judgment of first instance had assessed the
damage at a little under one million dollars. I am not suggesting
that only errors of fact of this magnitude warrant review, but this
is nevertheless a good example of palpable and overriding error.
I was a member of the panel which heard Vidéotron (for
two full days) and the argument on the existence of a palpable
and overriding error took only a few minutes. That in itself is
always very telling: How much time and effort is needed to
identify the error? An easy-to-identify error is likely to meet the
standard. That is what is meant by being “able to ‘put one’s
finger on’ the crucial flaw, fallacy or mistake,” the expression
used by Justice Fish in H.L.83 More recently, in Canada v. South
Yukon Forest Corporation,84 Justice Stratas of the Federal Court
of Appeal (whose language I quote at length because I think,
respectfully, that his analysis is impeccable) had this to say on
the topic after noting that “the parties had a fundamentally
different understanding of the meaning of palpable and
overriding error” in that “long and complex case,” and
acknowledging that the standard is “highly deferential”85:
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Comité provincial des malades, [2007] R.J.Q. 1753, 2007 QCCA 1068 (Que. Ct. App.).
Benchetrit was quoted and followed by the Court of Appeal of Quebec seventeen times and
referred to in other judgments of the Court 106 times, while Christ-Roi was quoted and
followed twenty-two times by the Court of Appeal of Quebec and referred to in other
judgments of the Court eighty-one times.
82. 2015 QCCA 422 (Que. Ct. App.).
83. 2005 SCC 25 at ¶ 70.
84. 2012 FCA 165.
85. Id. ¶¶ 43, 44, 46.
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In applying the concept of palpable and overriding error, it
is useful to keep front of mind the reasons why it is an
appropriate standard in a complex case such as this.
In this case, there were 40 days of trial stretched out over 6
months, with 19 witnesses and over 1,000 documents,
many of which were intricate and technical. In clear and
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thorough reasons showing considerable synthesis and
assessment of the complex evidence before her, the Federal
Court judge made key findings of fact. Some of these were
founded upon her assessment, clearly expressed, of the
credibility of the witnesses before her. Her credibility
findings concerning most of the Department’s officials who
testified are quite negative.
Immersed from day-to-day and week-to-week in a long and
complex trial such as this, trial judges occupy a privileged
and unique position. Armed with the tools of logic and
reason, they study and observe all of the witnesses and the
exhibits. Over time, factual assessments develop, evolve,
and ultimately solidify into a factual narrative, full of
complex interconnections, nuances and flavour.

...

The failure of counsel to heed the warnings of appellate
judges confronted with bulky records and convoluted or opaque
issues of fact probably accounts for the robustness of the
metaphors with which these judges reiterate the simple point
made in Housen and in H.L. Yet it should be self-evident by
now that a palpable and overriding error is not in the nature of
the proverbial needle in a haystack (une aiguille dans une botte
de foin) but is instead in the nature of the biblical beam in the
eye (une poutre dans l’oeil).87 Enough said.
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86. Id. ¶¶ 47–49, 52–54.
87. See J.G. c. Nadeau, 2016 QCCA 167 (Que. Ct. App.), at ¶ 77 (opining that “erreur
manifeste et dominante tient, non pas de l’aiguille dans une botte de foin, mais de la poutre
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In this Court, the Crown submitted that a number of the
Federal Court’s findings of fact should be set aside on the
basis of palpable and overriding error.
In my view, the Crown failed to establish palpable and
overriding error as it has been articulated above. The
Federal Court judge had a basis in the record for her key
factual findings. The Crown views the basis for some of
them expressed in the reasons as being rather thin. In some
regards that may be so but, as I have explained, thinness
alone is not palpable and overriding error.
Therefore, in this appeal, I shall proceed on the basis that
every one of the Federal Court’s findings of fact must
stand.86
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E. The Incidence of Institutional Constraints
on Reviewing Practices
There are also external reasons to be selective in exercising
appellate jurisdiction, reasons which are unrelated to the tenor of
legal issues arising in particular cases, or which have only a very
loose connection with the substance of those cases.
One such reason is the steadily increasing number of
querulous or vexatious litigants who lodge appeals as of right or
who systematically seek leave to appeal where leave is needed.88
That is a topic in itself and one for another day. But I will
mention in passing that in several appellate courts I know, there
are procedural safeguards available today, which did not exist
ten or twenty years ago, to prevent such litigants from
squandering the time and energy of the judges and court
personnel. Devices such as Rule 2.1 of the Ontario Rules of
Civil Procedure, which came into force in 2014, are now needed
to contain those types of situations.89 And we see here and there
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dans l’oeil”); see generally id. ¶¶ 75–79 (discussing palpable and overriding error), ¶¶ 128–
30 (noting that the appellate record disclosed primarily questions of fact and suggesting
that counsel took too aggressive an approach in criticizing the actions of the judge below in
an attempt to establish the existence of palpable and overriding error where there was
none), motion for leave to appeal to S. Ct. of Can. dismissed sub nom Grondin v. Nadeau,
2017 Carswell Que. 958 (S.C.C. Mar. 2, 2017) (dismissing application in light of Benhaim
v. St-Germain, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 352, 2016 SCC 48).
In Benhaim, a majority of five members of the Supreme Court of Canada adopted
the needle-in-a-haystack/beam-in-the-eye formulation, Benhaim at ¶ 39, and, in the absence
in that case of any palpable and overriding error of fact, dismissed the appeal. The two
Benhaim dissenters found no fewer than three palpable and overriding errors on the part of
the trial judge, id. ¶ 103 (opining that trial judge had “misconstrue[ed]” certain testimony,
“omitted” certain evidence, and “erred” in the “inference-drawing process itself”), errors
which had escaped the notice of the Court of Appeal. . . . It sometimes feels as if we are
running around in circles.
88. A judgment rendered by a panel I was part of on December 9, 2015, provides a
spectacular and sorry illustration of what I am describing here. See In re Poplawski, 2015
QCCA 2054 (Que. Ct. App.).
89. See generally Ont. R. Civ. P. 2.1 (addressing courts’ power to stay or dismiss
frivolous, vexatious, or abusive proceedings and motions); see also, e.g., Gao v. Ont.
(Workplace Safety & Ins. Bd.), 2014 ONSC 6497 (Ont. Super. Ct.). Justice Myers
observed in Gao that
[e]xperience teaches that vexatious litigant proceedings can be very expensive
and often serve just to give a vexatious party yet another opportunity to inflict
the very harms that the process is designed to end. To obtain a vexatious litigant
order, an applicant must commence a separate proceeding and prove that the
target has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious
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in the caselaw an innovative use of inherent powers to prevent
abuses of the appellate process by such litigants.90
The growing complexity of trials and appeals also warrants
case-management measures which may restrict the room for
manoeuvre of parties exercising their right of appeal. Large class
actions come to mind here, and I can provide a specific example.
I recently heard, with four colleagues, and over a period of six
days, an appeal from a Superior Court judgment delivered on
June 9, 2015.91 This judgment, after a trial of 251 days, awarded
some thirteen billion dollars to plaintiffs who sued several
cigarette manufacturers for selling a toxic product. We were
initially told that the record on appeal exceeded 257,000 pages,
but, as a result of deft case management in the Court of Appeal,
the record was pared down to 203,000 pages before it came to
us. The parties had identified before the hearing thirty-eight
common questions, and nineteen additional questions of interest
to only one of the appellants, for a total of fifty-seven.92 It
should be obvious that streamlining is de rigueur in litigation of
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proceedings or has conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner. The
requirement to show persistence has meant that litigants must endure several
vexatious proceedings prior to bringing a vexatious litigant proceeding. While
courts have recognized that vexatious litigants can inflict substantial costs on the
opposing parties and significant systemic costs, the harm is amplified by the
need to endure multiple frivolous proceedings before section 140 [of the Courts
of Justice Act] applies. Moreover, an application for a vexatious litigant
declaration is a separate legal proceeding. This gives the vexatious litigant a
platform from which to repeat all of her or his vexatious conduct. The
respondent in a vexatious litigant proceeding has all of the rights of a respondent
to a regular application—i.e. to file evidence, to cross-examine, to summon third
party witnesses, to bring motions, and, especially exhausting and expensive, the
right to or to seek leave to appeal at every step of the way. In virtually all of
these cases the respondents are impecunious and will not be able to pay the costs
awards that they invariably rack up along the way to being declared vexatious
litigants.
Id. ¶ 8.
90. See, e.g., Chutskoff Estate v. Bonora, 2014 ABCA 444 (Alta. Ct. App.). Justice
Slatter, sitting alone as a motions judge in Chutskoff Estate, dismissed three applications
for leave to appeal brought by a vexatious litigant and included these words in the
conclusion to his opinion: “This decision is final, and no application to reopen it will be
entertained. Any attempt to continue to litigate the issues resolved here, in any form and
under any pretext, will be treated as a contempt of court.” Id. ¶ 19.
91. Létourneau v. JTI-MacDonald Corp., 2015 QCCS 2382 (Que. Super. Ct.).
92. And this is only part of the story. In addition to these questions, which all pertain to
the final judgment, several interlocutory judgments on the admissibility of evidence which
could not be appealed at the time because they were being rendered during the trial, were
also challenged by the appellants.
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this complexity and that appellate judges cannot be expected to
review the entire record in order to form a view of the facts.
Picking gnats with tweezers definitely is not an option here. The
Housen rule, which directs appellate courts to assess claims of
error using the palpable and overriding standard, comes in handy
in this type of case.
Lastly, I must say a word or two of external and
institutional pressures on appellate courts. What I will describe
here is definitely more apparent in the federal courts of appeals
in the United States than in Canadian courts but we can detect in
Canada, at least in some appellate courts, tendencies that
resemble those which are now increasingly conspicuous in the
United States. One such indication is the growth in the number
of law clerks and staff lawyers in the Supreme Court of Canada
between 1980 and today.
The principal cause of this state of affairs below the border
appears easy to identify: it is the size of the federal appellate
judiciary relative its caseload.93 Between 1960 and 2010, the
average number of appeals filed per judge of the federal courts
of appeals each year increased from not quite sixty to almost
350. I do not think that we face this problem here—the number
of federally appointed judges in Canada appears to be
commensurate with the task at hand.
But other background factors also aggravate the pressure on
appellate courts. The increasing complexity of the docket,
notably because of mammoth class actions and complex civil-

Year
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010

Appeals Filed
3,899
11,662
23,200
40,898
54,697
56,790

Judges
68
97
132
167
167
167

Average per Judge
57.3
120.2
175.8
244.9
327.5
340.1
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WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 8 (2013). One solution would be to increase the
size of the appellate judiciary from the current 179 judges (a figure that includes some
visiting and senior-status judges) to a membership of 342. Id. at 170. That is an increase of
roughly ninety-two percent, which does not appear a likely scenario.

39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 46 Side A

93. Professors Richman and Reynolds, who speak of a caseload explosion, offer the
following statistics on the evolution of federal appellate caseloads in the United States.
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rights actions,94 is one such factor. Charter litigation, class
actions such as Létourneau,95 and mega criminal trials (e.g., in
Quebec, the Hells Angels cases96), arguably amount to a parallel
trend in Canada.
Some knowledgeable observers detect a marked
deterioration in the traditional high quality of appellate justice in
the federal courts of appeals. They blame it primarily on the
persistent refusal of the U.S. Congress to increase the size of the
federal judiciary in a manner commensurate with the growth of
its caseload.97 Another troubling factor is the equally persistent
refusal of Congress to address the issue of diminishing judicial
remuneration.98 The empirical foundation of this claim remains
a matter of debate among academics and the issues are
complex.99 Canadian judges continue to be spared many of these
annoyances. But in the United States, with such numbers,
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94. By way of example, between 1961 and 1979, as a result of two United States
Supreme Court cases, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the number of
habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners in the federal courts of appeals increased by
“roughly 1700 percent.” See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH AND DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 11 (1981).
95. See text accompanying notes 91 & 92, supra.
96. See, e.g., R. v. Stadnick, 2009 QCCA 1574 (Que. Ct. App.).
97. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 93, at 165–72.
98. More than a decade ago, Chief Justice Roberts warned against the pernicious effects
of this state of affairs on the recruitment of a diverse and well-qualified judiciary. John G.
Roberts, Jr., 2006 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 1, Supreme Court of the
United States, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/
2006year-endreport.pdf (referring to Congressional failure to raise salaries for federal
judges as “a constitutional crisis that threatens to undermine the strength and independence
of the federal judiciary”); see also id. passim (expounding on this topic, which was the
single focus of the 2006 Report).
99. See, e.g., Scott Baker, Should We Pay Federal Circuit Judges More? 88 B.U. L.
REV. 63 (2008) (ultimately disputing on empirical grounds the claim (or assumption) that
better pay will improve judicial performance); Christopher Zorn, William D. Henderson &
Jason J. Czarnezki, Working Class Judges, 88 B.U. L. REV. 829 (2008) (concluding that the
behavior of federal judges appointed from the country’s top five legal markets differs from
that of federal judges appointed from smaller markets, in which law-firm partners make
less than do law-firm partners in top legal markets); Scott Baker, Refining the Judicial
Salary/Judicial Performance Debate: A Response to Professors Cross, Czarnezki,
Henderson, Marks, and Zorn, 88 B.U. L. REV. 855 (2008) (acknowledging other scholars’
reactions to results of study reported in Should We Pay Federal Circuit Judges More? and
encouraging more empirical research).
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something had to give, and it did. Many of these changes
occurred in the last four decades:
i.

very short hearings (something still quite alien to
English lawyers and judges,100 though not quite so
alien for Canadian judges),

ii.

disposals with no hearing at all (overall in the
twelve federal courts of appeals, the average
percentage of merit terminations after an oral
hearing is eighteen percent),101

iii.

disposals without reasons in unpublished decisions,
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100. Let us remember here Anisminic, that famous 1969 case, argued for twelve days
(three weeks) in the Court of Appeal, and for twelve additional days (three weeks again) in
the House of Lords. Lengthy hearings of this kind were once the rule, not the exception:
Carl-Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No 2), [1966] All E.R. 536 (H.L.), was heard
for twenty-one days. As late as 1989, the House of Lords heard oral arguments for twentysix days in Maclaine Watson & Company Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry, [1990]
2 A.C. 418, a case that appears to have been relatively straightforward and in which the
performance of counsel prompted the following remarks by Lord Templeman, whose
opinion (or “speech”) was itself decidedly straightforward:
For the conduct of these appeals, there were locked in battle 24 counsel
supported by batteries of solicitors and legal experts, armed with copies of 200
authorities and 14 volumes of extracts, British and foreign, from legislation,
books and articles. Ten counsel addressed the Appellate Committee for 26 days.
This vast amount of written and oral material tended to obscure three
fundamental principles—that the capacities of a body corporate include the
capacity to contract, that no one is liable on a contract save the parties to the
contract and that treaty rights and obligations are not enforceable in the courts of
the United Kingdom unless incorporated into law by statute. In my opinion the
length of oral argument permitted in future appeals should be subject to prior
limitation by the Appellate Committee.
Id. at 483. By contrast, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
519 (2012), the challenge to Obamacare, took up a grand total of six hours, spread over
three days. See Tr. of Oral Arg., Fla. v. Dept. of HHS, 2012 WL 1031485 (Mar. 28, 2012)
(No. 11-400); Tr. of Oral Arg., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius, 2012 WL 1031484
(Mar. 28, 2012) (Nos.11-393 & 11-400); Tr. of Oral Arg., Dept. HHS v. Fla., 2012 WL
1017220 (Mar. 27, 2012) (No. 11-398); Tr. of Oral Arg., Dept. HHS v. Fla., 2012 WL
993811 (Mar. 26, 2012) (No. 11-398); see also Order Pertaining to the Allocation of Oral
Arg. Time, Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, Feb. 21, 2012, Nos. 11-393,
11-398, & 11-400 (allocating six hours of argument time among counsel for parties and
amici).
101. POSNER, supra note 33, at 233.
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iv.

no-citation rules while they lasted,102

v.

multiplication of law clerks (federal appellate
judges have a choice between five law clerks or four
law clerks and an assistant),103 and

vi.

exponential growth of the cadre of central staff
attorneys.104

11/15/2017 09:50:50

102. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 93, at 75–80.
103. POSNER, supra note 33, at 68.
104. Professors Richman and Reynolds document this trend and estimate at “about 500
staff attorneys” the size of the cohort at the time of publication in 2013. RICHMAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 93, at 112. That means an average of forty-one attorneys per
circuit.
105. See generally id.
106. POSNER, supra note 33, at 4. He adds that “[n]o one doubts that the judge is in
charge; that’s not the issue; the issue is who should be the opinion writer. I know for
certain of only three federal court of appeals judges besides myself who write all their own
drafts. I imagine that there are a few others; and I know that there are judges who write at
least some of their first drafts.” Id. at 223. It can be supposed that, having been appointed
to the Seventh Circuit in 1981, having been chief judge of that circuit from 1993 to 2000,
and remaining a member of the same court in 2016 at the age of 76, Judge Posner likely
knows what he is talking about.
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These are all signs of a Weberian bureaucratization of the
federal appellate system, a process which Professors Richman
and Reynolds deplore.105 One problematic effect of this
transformation in the practice of appellate judging is that very
few judges actually write their judgments. Judge Posner, again,
writes with commendable frankness in his book: “[T]he number
of federal judges who write their own opinions, as distinct from
editing (sometimes quite lightly) law clerks’ opinion drafts, can
probably be numbered on the fingers of two hands.”106 Since by
his count in 2016, there are 187 circuit judges, this observation
entails that 177 of them farm out, as it were, the writing of their
judgments, or merely edit what comes along after stating their
preferences to their clerks.
Professors Richman and Reynolds argue that a return to the
“Learned Hand treatment” is essential if the federal judiciary is
to retain its constitutional legitimacy in the United States. A
laudable thought but I suspect that they are not about to get
satisfaction.
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107. Id. at 227.
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Law never stands still for very long. Not surprisingly,
appellate standards of review in Anglo-American legal systems
have evolved a great deal through the ages. At different times,
they reflected different understandings of law and of legal
reasoning—those that prevailed in the climate of the day. One
thus detects a degree of porosity in these standards, a form of
osmosis with their environment, intellectual and normative.
Currently, we live in an era of realism or pragmatism about law.
We must accept that, in the words of a prominent American
jurist and judge, law is “not a science or even a social
science.”107 We know it to be a discipline firmly rooted in reality
which values a thorough and rigorous analysis of all relevant
facts and which responds well to prudential considerations.
The point of appeals in this context is not to hunt down
with passionate intensity all forensic claims of alleged error. The
standards of appellate review as they exist today strike a delicate
balance between promoting the systemic coherence of the law in
force here and now, and exercising an appropriate measure of
quality control over the many judgments and decisions of courts
of first instance and tribunals. It is also a fragile balance because
it can be upset by institutional and other pressures on the
appellate process. Vigilance is therefore needed to ensure the
integrity of this process. Without it, the rule of law is weakened
and perhaps meaningfully curtailed.

